Brian Ellis has argued that the assigning of forces is, in the final analysis, a matter of convention. This conclusion is backed by the premises (1) that forces and force-effects are necessary and sufficient for each other, and (2) that the classification of some state of affairs as a force-effect is at least partly conventional. We argue that the first premise is false, that the second premise is ambiguous as between several senses of "conventional," and finally that he has not (...) established that force-effects are conventional in the sense required for the conclusion he wishes to draw. (shrink)

The paper has two main aims. The first is to reformulate Hempel's version of the thesis of the symmetry of explanation and prediction, as regards the deductive covering-law model, so as to generalise it and make it no longer subject to some of the criticisms which have been directed at it (Section II). The second aim is to consider, with special critical reference to Hempel's recent treatment in Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York and London, 1965), some central criticisms of (...) both the constituent parts of the above symmetry thesis, viz. that adequate explanations are potentially predictive (Section III), and that adequate predictive arguments are potentially explanatory (Section IV). (shrink)

There is a widespread belief, more often implied than explicitly asserted, that Hume considered all necessary propositions to be analytic.Of course Hume did not use the analytic-synthetic distinction explicitly. This only come to the forefront with Kant; and it is Kant who is probably the main source of the above-mentioned belief. Kant ascribed to Hume the view that mathematical propositions are, in his terminology, analytic. If this is correct, then since mathematics was for Hume the paradigm of a body of (...) necessary truths, it is plausible to infer that he considered necessary propositions to be one and all analytic. The absence in Hume's writings of the analytic-synthetic terminology is by no means decisive: though he did not have the terms he may well have possessed the concepts, as evidenced by his use of them. (shrink)

According to Sir Karl Popper, there is a harmful approach to the social sciences called 'historicism'. This takes their principal aim to be historical prediction of an unconditional sort and the chief means to this the discovery of laws of historical development. The chief exemplar is held to be Marx. This paper distinguishes two possible sorts of laws of historical development. Popper's arguments against each are rejected. Which sort it is most plausible to ascribe to Marx is considered. Four models (...) of historical determinism are distinguished and the question of Marx's view or views on the question is discussed in terms of them. (shrink)